This paper is the first to use program administrative data from Brazil's National Employment System (SINE) to assess the impact of SINE job interview referrals on labor market outcomes. Data for a five-year period (2012)(2013)(2014)(2015)(2016) are used to evaluate the impact of SINE on employment probability, wage rates, time until reemployment, and job tenure. Differencein-differences estimates suggest that a SINE job interview referral increases the probability of finding a job within three months of the referral and reduces the number of months to find reemployment, the average job tenure of the next job, and the reemployment wage. Subgroup analysis suggests that compared to more educated workers, SINE is more effective in helping less educated workers by increasing their probability of finding a job and reducing time until reemployment. Finally, the evidence suggests that the online labor exchange is less effective than in-person services provided at SINE offices.
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Countries in the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region faced an array of labor market problems in the 1990s, including high unemployment, poor working conditions, and a lack of quality job opportunities. This situation generated policy interest in improving labor market programs, especially the public labor exchange. In recent years, labor market programs have garnered a bigger share of public resources in the region and have served more job seekers and employers since labor market policy has become an important macroeconomic policy instrument in the LAC region (Ramos 2002) .
In Brazil, even though labor markets have performed reasonably well over the past 15 years in terms of labor market participation and labor earnings growth, the unemployment rate increased from an average of 6.9 percent in 2011-2014 to an average of 12 percent in the last four years, influenced by a recession that started in the second quarter of 2014.
1 The country's National Employment System (SINE) is a key institution in terms of public labor policies and can become even more relevant during economic downturns.
SINE focuses on less educated and low-skilled job seekers, but it also provides services for customers who have higher education and job qualifications. This paper focuses on services to the majority of customers who have a history of job turnover in the formal sector, and our subgroup analyses should inform policymakers about the effectiveness of SINE for the full range of customers. Improving SINE's ability to increase coverage to less skilled job seekers while improving SINE's services to more qualified job seekers could contribute to reducing the time it takes to fill vacancies. In Brazil it takes almost twice as long (nine weeks) to fill a skilled vacancy as compared to the LAC average (five weeks) (Aedo and Walker 2012) .
As a percentage of the total budget for all active labor market programs, spending on labor intermediation services in Brazil is low as compared to OECD countries. Brazil spends less than 2 percent of its active labor market program budgets on labor intermediation services delivered by SINE, whereas OECD countries spend an average of 10 percent of their active labor market program budgets on public labor exchanges (Silva, Almida, and Strokova 2015, p 114) . Since labor intermediation programs typically benefit low-skilled workers, countries with a larger proportion of these job seekers could benefit from a larger investment.
Improving the efficiency of the public employment service (PES) is essential to support quick, successful, and high-quality job matches (Betcherman, Olivas, and Dar 2004 ). An effective PES contributes to labor market efficiency and transparency, reducing informational imperfections that prevent the proper matching of job-seeker skills with employer job vacancies. Borges, Lobo, and Foguel (2017) 
estimate that PES labor intermediation in Brazil saved the Worker Protection
Fund budget about R$43 million in 2016 through reduced unemployment insurance (UI) payments.
Because the PES provides services free of charge, it also improves equity in access to social participation through the labor market. Even though it is not an explicitly stated organizational objective, the PES potentially moves workers from informal to formal sector jobs that provide access to public health insurance and other benefits of activation. Finally, it is worth noting that even if labor intermediation does not have a significant effect on aggregate employment, it can help maintain the attachment of the long-term unemployed to the labor force, thereby decreasing their dependence on social assistance programs.
Considering the importance of PES, the paucity of research on program effectiveness in developing countries is remarkable. Among the studies conducted in the United States and Europe, the evidence is consistently positive (Johnson, Dickinson, and West 1985; Katz 1991; Jacobson and Petta 2000; Blundell et al. 2004; O'Leary 2015; Warren and Klee 2017; Toohey 2017) .
Although the estimated impacts on employment and earnings are typically small, the low cost of interventions often makes PES referral services cost-effective.
The few studies conducted in Latin America have had mixed results. Chacaltana and Sulmont (2003) find that the Peruvian PES more than tripled the probability of employment and increased earnings by 27 percent in the year after employment. On the other hand, Vera (2013) finds that participation in the PES in Peru lengthens unemployment spells by 33 days. Whereas
Flores Lima (2010) finds no significant effects of the PES on the probability of finding a job in Mexico, PES users almost doubled their earnings and tripled their rate of employment in formal sector jobs. Pignatti (2016) finds that using the Colombian PES increased the likelihood of having a formal job by between 5 and 31 percentage points but had a small negative effect on hourly earnings, with declines ranging from 2 to 5 percent.
Although program administrative statistics on labor intermediation in Brazil exist, to date there has not been a formal impact evaluation. This paper is a first step in that direction. The results of differences-in-differences estimations using microdata from 2012 to 2016 show that a job referral by SINE increases employment probability within the next three months and reduces the number of months until employment. However, SINE referrals are also estimated to decrease the average tenure and salary of the next job.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, we provide a background of related literature and a description of the data and descriptive statistics used. We then present the methodology and results, followed by concluding remarks.
4

BACKGROUND
Previous related research literature reports mixed evidence on the effectiveness of work intermediation programs. Evaluations of the PES have focused mainly on the impacts on employment probability, unemployment duration, and earnings. Specifically, some papers attempt to estimate national average employment impacts. The earliest attempts to assess the impact of PES are found in the United States in papers by Johnson, Dickinson, and West (1985) and Katz (1991) . Johnson et al. evaluate the effect of referrals to job interviews made by local offices of the U.S. Employment Service (ES), comparing the employment and earnings outcomes of those referred to job interviews to ES registrants who were not referred. The authors find significant positive effects on women's return to work, including the probability of employment six months after the job interview referral, the probability of remaining in the labor force, and earnings.
However, the effect of an ES job interview referral for men was insignificant. The authors suggest that this result can be explained by the barriers women face in accessing other methods of job seeking. Katz (1991) analyzed the role of ES in assisting dislocated workers in Pennsylvania who remained jobless for extended periods of time. Dislocated workers were defined as those who received UI benefits, had strong job attachment, and did not have a job in the quarter immediately prior to applying for UI. Katz finds that the effectiveness of the ES was dependent on the duration of unemployment. While job search assistance from the ES was more effective at the beginning of unemployment, job placements and referrals to job interviews had bigger effects on reemployment a few quarters later. Jacobson and Petta (2000) A European study by Launov and Wälde (2016) uses the Mortensen-Pissarides matching model and finds that an increase in operating effectiveness by the German public employment agency reduced unemployment nationwide. Notably, this reform turned out to favor long-term unemployed workers at the expense of newly unemployed workers, even though the long-term unemployed are regarded as particularly difficult to serve. Crépon et al. (2013) measure the impacts of job placement assistance on the labor market outcomes of young, educated job seekers in France. They find that even though the program increases the likelihood of finding a stable job in France, the positive effect diminishes over time, and often comes at the expense of other eligible workers. Crépon et al. (2013) suggest that French job placement assistance had little net effect on overall unemployment in the country. Blundell et al. (2004) use a difference-in-differences (DID) approach to analyze the impact of the "New Deal for Young People" in the UK, a compulsory program aimed at helping young people to claim unemployment benefits for at least six months. The program offers job assistance for four months and a wage subsidy paid to employers. The authors find that the program increased the probability of young men finding a job in the next four months by 5 percentage points. This impact was larger at the beginning of the New Deal program.
6
Other studies compare the impacts of publicly and privately delivered employment services. For example, Behaghel, Crépon, and Gurgand (2014) compare the effectiveness of an intensive program provided by the public employment agency and private contractors in France.
The study concludes that the publicly provided services had greater and faster impacts on exit to employment than private services. In contrast, Vera (2013) finds that the Peruvian PES had smaller impacts on unemployment spells compared to alternative job search methods (e.g., private agencies). The author cites factors that may reduce coverage and lessen the effectiveness of the program, such as informal labor markets, low use by highly skilled persons who normally work in salaried employment, high labor turnover, lack of unemployment benefits, and little confidence in public sector institutions. Pignatti (2016) estimates that the Colombian PES has a positive effect on the probability of getting a job in the formal sector when services are provided face-to-face (i.e., in PES centers) rather than online. The results suggest that the effects on formality come from professional labor market matching in face-to-face services provided by the PES. The author also finds that using the Colombian PES positively impacts the probability of having a formal job, and that this effect is due to the program's capacity to place job seekers in large companies. On the other hand, the results show that getting a job through the PES in Colombia has a negative effect on earnings.
Pignatti's work is particularly relevant to our research, because it analyzes the effectiveness of the PES for subgroups of service recipients in a Latin America context. However, it is important to note that Pignatti's data is based on a sample of PES users from a general household survey that does not have a panel structure and does not provide detailed information on previous job search history.
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Technology is changing the manner in which public services are provided. Digital channels for labor intermediation have been adopted in many countries to contribute to the effectiveness and efficiency of various services. Nevertheless, to our knowledge, little empirical evidence is available on how mobile technologies impact labor intermediation services and employment
outcomes. An exception is Dammert, Galdo, and Galdo (2015) , who designed an experiment to assess the causal impacts of mobile phone (digital) public labor market intermediation in Peru.
The analysis presented in this paper contributes to our knowledge about digital channels for labor intermediation and investigates how online and face-to-face systems of service provision differ with respect to their effectiveness in placing job seekers in formal jobs and the quality of such placements. This is an important aspect for intermediation services in many developed and developing economies because the recent focus of labor policies has been on investing in the development of online intermediation platforms as a means to increase coverage and reduce costs.
Our paper uses the full population of PES users in Brazil merged to RAIS (Relação Anual de Informações Sociais--Annual Social Information Report) longitudinal data on employment and earnings and is, to our knowledge, the most complete evaluation of labor intermediation conducted in Latin America. Therefore, while Pignatti's analysis cannot directly investigate the effects of program participation on the probability of finding a job, we are able to do so, since our unique dataset allows us to follow job seekers' labor history, prior to and following the SINE job interview referral.
Only one prior study has attempted to assess the effectiveness of job interview referrals on different groups of participants in Brazil. Woltermann (2002) finds that the only significant channels for a transition into formal sector jobs were directly contacting the employer, using connections through family and friends, and responding to advertisements. Nevertheless, the study 8 is based on the Monthly Employment Surveys collected by the Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE) and does not include data from Brazilian employment services.
Thus, the existing literature does not provide a comprehensive impact evaluation of the effectiveness of labor intermediation programs on employment probability, earnings, time until reemployment, and job tenure in Latin America. This paper provides the first attempt to understand the effectiveness of such important nationwide active labor market programs in the Latin American context using data from Brazil.
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
We constructed a unique dataset merging administrative data from the SINE with data from the RAIS to analyze the effectiveness of labor intermediation in Brazil. The SINE was established in 1975 as a public agency for labor market programs, including the labor exchange. Its original purpose was to promote labor intermediation, but currently its services include professional orientation, referral to qualification and training programs, job placement, labor market information, issuance of formal workers identification credentials, and management of some components of the UI program, including payment of benefits.
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The intermediation process involves the registration of workers and employers, recording information on the employment histories of job seekers, and solicitation and listing of job vacancies. It also entails the matching of job-seeker profiles with the requirements of vacancies, summoning and referring workers to interviews based on the matching results, and capturing referral outcomes. In addition, SINE's intermediation service involves the management of job 9 vacancy listings from the moment they are received to the moment they are filled or expired. The SINE database contains socioeconomic information on workers from registration (age, gender, education, and employment status), employers, and records of available job vacancies and job interview referrals (status of the referral, employer feedback, and type of service offered). The
SINE database includes the unique individual identification number Cadastro de Pessoas Físicas
(CPF), which allows us to track job seekers during the period of analysis.
SINE data are complemented by the RAIS annual administrative dataset, which is compiled by the Labor Ministry of Brazil and contains employment and earnings information on all formal firms and employed workers in a given year. 3 All formally registered firms in Brazil report annual information on their employees. The RAIS dataset includes detailed information on the employer, the employee, and the employment relationship (wage, tenure, type of employment, hiring and separation date, reason for separation, among others). Importantly, RAIS is a linked employeremployee matched dataset that can be linked to the SINE dataset using the CPF.
For this study, we use RAIS data from 2011 through 2016. The RAIS dataset is structured such that each observation represents an employment relationship containing the dates of hiring and separation. We use these data to construct a monthly panel with information on each individual's employment status in each month. Our aim is to analyze exit from unemployment of workers with recent experience in formal sector jobs. The panel data allow us to observe workers with more than one job at the same time (i.e., multiple job holders). Because job loss for a multiple job holder does not result in full unemployment, our sample excludes workers who at some point had multiple simultaneous formal sector jobs.
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Because most workers who seek SINE's assistance are unemployed (94 percent), we restrict the analysis to workers who were separated from their job at some point before a job interview referral. In the panel using information from the RAIS, a period between jobs in RAIS is a period of non-employment in the formal sector. Using the information from the separation and hiring dates in RAIS, we create a panel of individuals with formal employment history and at least one non-employment spell in the formal sector.
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A person who received a referral in 2012 had a 90 percent probability of finding a formal job within the next five years. This means that restricting the panel to workers with at least one unemployment spell and a registry of formal employment after being referred to a job interview by SINE retains most of the observations in our panel.
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Taking these restrictions into account, the study addresses unemployed individuals who were never multiple job holders in the period analyzed, but who had at least two jobs in the RAIS, one before and one after a job interview referral. We make this sample restriction because only the RAIS data allow us to calculate the outcomes, and only the workers with a formal job history are included in this database. The unemployment (or non-formal employment) periods correspond to individuals who were hired at some point in the panel after being separated. The resulting panel includes 30 million unemployment spells, 29 million workers, and about 5 million individuals per month before the matching. In this data, about 65,000 job interview referrals are observed each month. The average job tenure in the data is about two years, suggesting that the five-year available time span used in the paper is not short and that monthly analysis is required for short average job tenures.
7 5 RAIS data include formal sector workers. We refer to non-employment in the formal sector as unemployment. 6 This is unlikely to be an issue even for the last year of the data; about 43% of workers who received a referral in 2016 got a job in the same year. 7 The average job tenure for the formal private sector in Brazil is about 3.5 years (DIEESE 2016).
11
Combining the SINE and RAIS datasets allows us to trace the duration of formal employment, time until reemployment, and earnings in the new job for individuals who look for employment through SINE agencies as compared to those who use other job-search methods. To evaluate the impact of labor intermediation, we construct a monthly database with matches of referrals to non-referrals. The database matches only one referral each month per 8 Table 1 shows the number of new SINE registrants per year. For example, in 2016, 4,587,164 workers registered with SINE for the first time. Thus, 31.7 million is the number of unique workers registered. 9 In the SINE system, one "vacancy" posted by an employer might represent more than one position. For instance, a firm might submit one "vacancy" requiring 10 employees. On average, 3.8 positions are offered per each SINE "vacancy." This average increases to 5.4 positions per vacancy when taking into account only the vacancies that were filled with at least one position. 12 individual, even if that individual was referred more than once in a month.
10 Table 2 shows that 94 percent of the referrals are made for unemployed job seekers, which is the group of workers analyzed in this study. 11 The average age of the workers referred by SINE is about seven years higher for the unemployed than for the employed. The total mean age of all the SINE applicants is about 30 years old. Almost 50 percent of the workers are high school graduates, but only 11 percent have some college education. Finally, 58 percent of the registrants are male and 61 percent are considered non-white. 
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Brazil is well known for having wide regional variations culturally and economically, and this extends to the SINE system. Therefore, in estimating program effects, it is important to control for differences across states. (27, 270) . The richness of the data available allows us to control for heterogeneity in labor markets as explained in the next section. 
METHODOLOGY Evaluation
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the effects of SINE job interview referrals on labor market outcomes. That is, we analyze the effect of referrals by SINE offices on labor market outcomes of participants as compared to the labor market outcomes of non-participants. However, simple differences of means between participants and non-participants will not yield reliable estimates of program effects because the characteristics of the two groups are likely to be different due to self-selection into SINE registration and services. Thus, we compare the outcomes of two groups, one given the treatment and one not given the treatment to serve as a baseline reference.
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The evaluation problem is to compare participants to themselves with and without the service. However, in practice, we cannot observe an outcome for service recipients as if they had not received it. To measure SINE's impact, therefore, we must construct comparison groups of non-participants with similar average characteristics as the program participants. In this study, we use Propensity Score Matching (PSM) to construct comparison groups and then estimate group mean effects or the average treatment effect on those who were treated. The individuals in the matched comparison group are similar to the participants in observed characteristics, except for the referral. To this end, we construct a counterfactual for treated individuals by selecting a group of non-participants who have a similar pre-treatment conditional probability of receiving a treatment.
The propensity scores used to balance characteristics between participant and nonparticipant groups is estimated by the following probit model for each subgroup evaluated:
In this specification, we calculate the probability of being referred for a job interview P(D=1|X) as a function of observable individual characteristics (given in the next paragraph). We use two strategies to construct control groups based on the probability of being referred for a job interview. First, we construct control groups using the pool of workers that registered at a SINE office but were not referred for a job interview. This approach mitigates selection bias because workers who visit a SINE office might be self-selected and expose themselves to the treatment for several non-observable characteristics, such as level of self-motivation and general proactiveness. Alternative control groups are constructed based on a broader pool of workers 13 Lechner (2002) also matches with a mixture of exact characteristics and propensity scores, matching exactly on gender, duration of unemployment, and native language. Lechner also uses propensity scores in an evaluation of active labor market programs in Switzerland.
14 CNAE is the national classification of economic activities. 15 CBO is the Brazilian classification of professions. 16 Heinrich, Maffioli, and Vázquez (2010) suggest that interacting vector X with state and month improves the matching model. We apply a simplified PSM to subgroup analyses, where fewer observations are available (education, age group, SINE WEB [online self-referrals to job interviews], gender, and unemployment insurance) to improve efficiency in terms of processing time and to maintain the quality of the matching. In order to simplify the probit model, we eliminate variables that are not significant and reduce the number of interactions. For the exact matching, only region was used, and time until matching became a control in the regression. The specification for the simplified probit is the following:
available in the RAIS at any point of our panel who were not referred for job interviews using SINE services (i.e., they did not visit a SINE office). These control groups are more subject to selection bias because most workers in RAIS do not visit a SINE office. 17 Thus, our main results are based on the control groups applying the first strategy. Additionally, we require the common support condition to be met exactly. Results using alternate control groups constructed using RAIS are presented in Appendix C.
After estimating propensity score models, the next step is to perform the matching and assess its quality. The literature suggests that observable characteristics should be balanced between the two groups after matching. The matching is performed monthly, so the balance in the means of basic obervable characteristics must be checked each month. Table 4 shows the t-test results for differences in means before and after matching for certain characterictics in November 2016. A bias reduction is expected after matching. The t-tests show that before matching, the participant and comparison groups are sigificantly different on most observable characteristics, but after the matching there are very few significant differences. This suggests that the participant and non-participant matched samples are well balanced.
The matching does not necessarily need to be balanced in all variables to be satisfactory, and we use the mean standardized bias to formally assess the quality of the PSM. 18 The standardized bias of an estimated mean is the difference between the means of the participant and comparison groups divided by the average of the standard deviations for the two groups. If observable characteristics are balanced between the control and treatment groups after matching, it is expected that the mean standardized bias between control and treatment groups will be significantly reduced. According to empirical studies, a final bias below 5 percent after matching should be sufficient (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008) . Each point in Figure 1 represents the average of the standardized bias of the mean estimates averaged across all exogenous variables (used in the PSM) after matching, calculated for one month in the sample period. The figure shows that 
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We use the participant and comparison groups constructed by propensity score matching to measure impacts on the following labor market outcomes: employment, time from registration until employment, job tenure, and reemployment monthly earnings. As described previously, to perform the matching, we restricted the database to workers who lost their job and obtained a new one, which allows us to calculate the pre-and post-matching variables. Details on the calculation of the resulting outcomes (pre-and post-treatment) are provided below.
Measuring SINE Impact on Labor Market Outcomes
Having constructed counterfactual groups for workers who had a SINE job interview referral through propensity score matching, which was validated by three tests, we use the constructed counterfactual groups in the following DID specification to estimate the impact of a job interview referral on labor market outcomes for worker i:
where Yit stands for one of the four outcome measures for individual i and time t. Employment within 3 months of referral establishes whether at the month of the matching the worker got a job within three months of the referral. In the evaluation, this variable is always 0 for the pre-matching period. 20 Time until employment is the unemployment time between jobs, calculated as the date of admission to the next job minus the date of separation from the previous job. 21 Mean tenure is the tenure of the last job before the matching or the first job after the matching, accordingly. The sample is restricted to workers who lost their job after the matching, so that the variable is not censored. Finally, Reemployment wage is based on the natural logarithm of real wages of the last job before and after the matching.
The term captures all time-constant factors that affect the outcome. is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual gets a SINE job referral or not, and Post takes the value of 1 after treatment. The variable SINE is the interaction between and Post. , the 20 To evaluate this outcome, we remove matches from September 2016 onwards to leave only observations that are well defined (individuals that possess at least 3 months of information for this outcome). 21 The sample of this database is especially restricted because it requires each worker to have at least three jobs in the panel to allow for unemployment time between jobs before and after the treatment.
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coefficient of interest, measures the difference in the outcome variable between the treated and control groups before and after receiving services from SINE. represents the monthly dummy variables. The matrix X includes alternative education and sector variables for individual workers who are not included in the PSM. 22 We also include information on whether the worker is a beneficiary of UI, dummies for the n th UI payment, and total number of referrals.
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RESULTS
Overall Results
The analysis compares the effect of referrals on the probability of workers finding a job within three months of the referral, time until employment, the mean tenure of the next job, and the reemployment salary as compared to workers who were registered at SINE but did not get a job referral.
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The treatment increases the likelihood of finding a job within three months of the referral by 19.7 percentage points (Table 5 ). In addition, job seekers who are referred by SINE take less time (0.9 months) to find a job, but SINE job referrals have a negative impact on the mean tenure of the next job found (a 4.1 month reduction). Finally, being treated by SINE reduces wages by about 3.5 percent, 25 which is consistent with Pignatti (2016) and Vera (2013) and might be related to stigmatization effects on SINE participants or the lack of the program's capacity to attract high-22 paying enterprises. 26 The estimated effects are the average for the period of analysis. Because of the short job tenure duration and high worker turnonver in the Brazilian labor market, the fiveyear time span was sufficient to provide results on how SINE affects labor market outcomes. 
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Demographic Subgroups
Subgroup estimations are important in identifying heterogenous effects of SINE services and in guiding the strategy to provide services for workers with different characteristics. For each subgroup, we calculate a specific PSM for each of the 60 months of the data and estimate the corresponding DID.
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Results dissagregated by gender are presented in Table 6 . The positive and negative effects are in the same direction as the overall estimations provided in Table 5 , but the impact of an interview referral is different for women and men. SINE increases the probability of finding a job within three months by 23 percentage points for men and 21 percentage points for women. The 26 We used PSM to match firms that posted vacancies at SINE and firms that did not in 2015. Matching variables were the proportion of males, proportion of white workers, average worker age, firm size, sector classification, and state of the firm. This exercise suggests that wages at firms that post vacancies at SINE are R$140 lower than a similar firm that does not post vacancies at SINE. The results that SINE referrals decrease the time to reemployment but also reduce the time of employment and salary need further investigation because getting a job faster may be related to a poor quality of the matching. Nevertheless, the overall data do not provide a clear correlation between time until employment and tenure and salary.
27 Appendix E (Table E .1) provides similar results using only data for referrals made in 2012, which allows the effects of SINE to be measured in a longer time span. 28 The effects across groups are not compared directly to estimates on the full sample because the DID estimates and PSMs matches are done separately for each subgroup sample (i.e., comparing women who get interview referrals to women who did not get interview referrals) to allow for the best matching and estimations against each control group. Alternative results for the full model based on one general PSM and estimating subgroup effects in the same regression are provided upon request. Complete models are estimated for gender, education, age, race, and receipt of unemployment insurance. Estimating coefficients in the same regression allows for a better comparison across different groups and tests of the equality of coefficients; however, it provides poorer matching, as those treated in subgroups might be matched with a control that belongs to another subgroup. reemployment wage, however, is reduced by 4 percent for men and 5 percent for women, whereas the time until employment is reduced by 1.8 months for men and 1.4 months for women.
Understanding the heterogenous impact of the labor intermediation across workers with diffferent levels of education is important. Education is disaggregated into three categories in Table 7 : unskilled (from illiterate to completed primary school), semi-skilled (some or completed high school), and skilled (from some undergraduate education to PhD). Most of the applicants (80 percent) are considered semi-skilled, and 10 percent each are considered unskilled and skilled. The magnitude of the effect of referrals on the probability of finding a job within three months decreases as the years of education increase, which means that SINE increases the probability of getting a job for lower skilled applicants (compared to the same non-treated group) more effectively as compared to the group of skilled workers. Also, the wage-lowering effect of SINE referrals (compared to the non-referred) is stronger for the most skilled applicants (1 percent for unskilled job seekers versus a 22 percent drop for skilled workers). This negative effect on wages might signal SINE's inability to attract high-quality vacancies. Unskilled applicants referred by SINE also have the greatest reduction in time until employment (1.2 months) as compared to semiskilled (1.0) and skilled (0.9) job seekers. In addition. SINE also reduces the job tenure of unskilled workers by the lowest amount (1.3 months) as compared with semi-skilled (1.6) and skilled (2.4) applicants with job referrals. The size of the positive effect of SINE referrals on the time to find a job diminishes as workers age (Table 8 ). The time reduction as compared to the control group decreases from 1.5 months in the youngest group (18-24 years old) to 0.35 in the oldest group (55-64 years old). In contrast. the negative effect of the referrals on job duration is greatest in the older groups, up to 2.6 months for the 55-64-year-old group. 
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The results by race are presented in Table 9 . SINE has similar qualititive impact on white and non-white workers, but the results suggest that the negative impact of SINE on job tenure is greater for white applicants. This suggests that the negative effect of the program on the tenure of the next job is less important for non-white applicants. It is important to note that RAIS is an administrative database where employers classify the race of employees based subjective criteria, which can be particularly problematic in a country as diverse as Brazil. Paixão et al. (2012) and
Camara (2015) present results showing discrepancies between RAIS, PNAD (a national household survey), and Census data on race. The differences are significant, and RAIS presents a higher proportion of whites as compared to PNAD and the Census. 29 Thus, the results on race must be interpreted with caution. Paixão et al. (2012) show that RAIS, in 2009, identifies 61.2% of the individuals as whites, whereas PNAD identifies 54.7% of workers as white. Camara (2015) shows that 2010 RAIS data identifies 60% of workers as white and the 2010 Census only identifies 53% of workers as white. Race is divided into five categories in the RAIS data (indigenous, white, dark, yellow, and brown), but we divided the data into white and non-white in Table 9 . 30 For this analysis, we use the simplified PSM model, adding dummies for the number of UI payments that the worker still has to receive. The exact matching is made by region and number of entitled payments. Finally, we did not include people who applied for UI and did not receive the benefit in the group of non-beneficiaries.
Unemployment Status
26
incentives to have formal employment. Specifically, Carvalho and Narita (2016) find that Brazil's formal sector workers who have access to UI have the ability and incentives to induce their own resignations to some extent. Except for the reemployment wage, the impact of SINE on UI nonbeneficiaries is greater as compared to the effects on beneficiaries: they have a higher probability of getting a job within three months of the referral, their reduction in reemployment time is much greater (by almost one month), and the reduction in tenure is smaller (by 56 days). On the other hand, the reduction in the reemployment wage is smaller for the group of unemployment beneficiaries. Thus, SINE's effectiveness for UI beneficiaries might be affected by higher reservation UI recipients. The long-term unemployed, defined as people who have been unemployed for more than 12 months, is an especially vulnerable group of applicants. Results for this group show little difference in the effect of referrals on employment within three months, whereas the effect is stronger for this group in terms of the time it takes to get a job, which is 0.5 months shorter, and the mean tenure of the next job, which is 2 months longer (Table 11 ). Nevertheless, the negative impact on wage is more pronouced for long-term unemployment. Table 12 shows the results of the internet-referral analysis. The first panel provides the effect of SINE online referrals, and the second panel shows the effect of SINE online referrals against the control group using face-to-face referrals. Online referrals increase the probability of finding a job within three months of the referrals by 13.4 percentage points, but they reduce mean tenure by 1.9 months and the reemployment wage by 4.9 percent. The results show that face-toface referrals are generally more effective. The probability of getting a job within three months is 3 percentage points lower with online referrals, the time until employment after the referral is 0.48 months longer, the mean tenure is 0.4 months lower, and the reemployment wage is 1 percent higher. Thus, the results suggest that online referrals are effective, but to a lesser extent than faceto-face service. These results are consistent with those reported by Pignatti (2016) , who finds that the Colombian intermediation service is more effective when it is provided face-to-face rather than online. 
Internet-Based Referrals
